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3 Introduction
Introduction
Cloud services expose their resources and operations using Web APIs
Web APIs are applied to support core business of service providers
How can be security aspects of service use and resource sharing be managed?
Some issues:
o Obstacles due to proprietary interfaces and hard-wiring
o Interoperability of security controls across diverse organizations
o Provider-centric management of security in the cloud 
o Capability of security controls
Managing and coordinating security of our assets hosted at other providers?
4 Motivational Scenario
Motivational Scenario
eXample Inc. uses Zapier to automate its tasks
Zapier connects data sources from Gmail and MailChimp on behalf of a customer
Web APIs (REST) typically applied to expose and share resources
Task:
o Periodically retrieve and extract email senders from recent emails at Gmail
o Add them as subscribers to a list at MailChimp
on behalf of
5 Motivational Scenario
Authorization in the Cloud
Authorization: Zapier needs access to resources at both providers
Typical case relies on OAuth 2.0 Web Authorization Framework – RFC 6749
Primary concepts in OAuth 2.0:
o Resource owner, resource server, authorization server, client
o Initiate authorization flow to obtain access credentials
o Access token – most commonly used access credential
o Access scope – determines the  extent of permissions given to the agent
6 Motivational Scenario
Authorization Flows
Obtaining access token (initially)
Retrieving resource or performing operations (repetitive)
The same flow is applied in the case of MailChimp as well
Access token
Protected resource
Authorization
Server
Resource
Server
7 Motivational Scenario
Obtaining Consent - Zapier
Resource owner is presented with the interface to 
review and allow the permissions given to the client
Permissions are abstracted as a scope
Scopes requested by Zapier:
o gmail.compose
o gmail.modify
Both scopes provide broad range of operations 
over all instances of subsumed resources
8 Motivational Scenario
Obtaining Consent - MailChimp
MailChimp does not apply scopes
The given permissions include 
all operations over every resource
No compartmentalization applied
9 Motivational Scenario
Broad Permissions
Requirements from use cases:
o Gmail: (1) retrieving a list of recent messages and (2) the value of 
From: field from the header of these messages needed
o MailChimp: (3) adding an entity to a particular subscriber list
The problem with broad permissions:
o Zapier allowed to retrieve and manage all messages in an account 
o This includes managing drafts, sending or temporarily deleting messages
o Can execute any API operation at MailChimp
Potentially leads to numerous security and privacy risks
Applies to most integrations
10 Scope properties
Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive
Established by the service provider
Designated as a predefined set
Imposed to other entities
Excluding resource owners and clients
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Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive
Statically determined
Immutable sets of permissions
Typically do not change in production
12 Scope properties
Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive
Defined as opaque strings
Cannot be decomposed
Authorization extent cannot be derived
Discovery of supported or provided 
authorizations not possible
Dynamic definition not supported
13 Scope properties
Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive
The scope extent communicated non-transparently
Described in service documentation (for developers)
Applications cannot interpret the scope
14 Scope properties
Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive
Specific to the service
May reflect business model or view of SP
Cannot be decomposed
Predefined set with built-in properties
15 Scope properties
Properties of Access Scopes
Unilateral definition
Invariable
Unstructured
Out-of-the-band
Coupled
Context insensitive Cannot express attributes of resources, 
environment or involved parties
The same parameters apply to all contexts 
(end-users, resources, target environment)
16 Integrated Authorization Management
Integrated Authorization Management
Supporting integrated authorization management:
Granular specification of authorizations
Claiming acceptable constraints
Context-dependent enforcement
Selective and transformational sharing
Scalable management
17 Integrated Authorization Management
Contribution
Defining management flows 
o Supporting cooperative and adaptive authorization management
Defining supporting vocabularies
o Describing requests, responses, contextual properties and resource restrictions
o Describing access control and OAuth 2.0 entities
Establishing authorization descriptor 
o Relies on vocabularies
o Supports granular, instructive and expressive specification
o Structuring authorization requirements and grants
o Applicable beyond single organization
18 Integrated Authorization Management
Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
Provider exposes service description
Includes available resources, their structure and organization
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Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
Client retrieves service model and decides the extent of required permissions
Finding intersection between security and functional goals
Considers exposed resources, applicable constraints and supported operations
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Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
Client generates authorization request 
Expresses its acceptable range of permissions and constraints
Deliver request interactively or asynchronously
21 Integrated Authorization Management
Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
Resource owner inspects and refines the request
Interactive request: inspected using owner’s client involved in the flow
Asynchronous request: on the side of service provider
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Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
After consent by resource owner is obtained
Server-side transformation into security policy
Considers target system and environment
23 Integrated Authorization Management
Management Flows
Defining management flows:
(1) Exposing the service descriptor
(2) Determining the request scope
(3) Requesting authorization
(4) Refining authorization extent
(5) Transforming into security policy
(6) Inspecting authorization descriptor
Optionally providing authorization descriptor back to the client
Allows the client to determine the degree of provided (redacted) permissions
24 Integrated Authorization Management
Vocabularies
Uses semantic vocabulary as a building block, establishing a 
formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization
Ω = (C, R, E, I)
C – classes (unary predicates)
R – relations (binary or higher predicates)
E – explicit instances of classes and relations
A - axioms 
Explicitly defined concepts, properties, 
relations, functions, constraints, axioms
Consensual knowledge
Abstract model and simplified 
view of some phenomenon 
Machine-
understandable
25 Integrated Authorization Management
Vocabularies
Organizing vocabularies in layers according to their role in the process
Concepts in vocabularies serve as terminological knowledge (T-Box)
To describe services or interactions we instantiate them as assertions (A-Box)
Authorization descriptor – a graph-based structure, instantiates concepts from vocabularies 
Conforms to descriptions and capabilities announced by services
Roles: AuthorizationRequest, AuthorizationResponse, ErrorResponse
Service Layer
Interaction Layer
Authorization Layer
27 Application – Use Scenario
Exposing Service Description
Given a service vocabulary Ω(s) = {C, R, ε, I}
Service provider exposes a service description
M= {CM, RM, EM, IM} | CM C, RM R, IM I and e EM, e CM  e RM
Provided as RDF, JSON-LD or Turtle
Service description typically includes:
o Exposed resources and intents (actions)
o Relations between resources and actions
o Parameters and URL mappings for entities
o Organization of resources (consisting elements)
o Supported operations in the service (transformative)
o Extraction rules for resources or their elements
28 Application – Use Scenario
Exposing Service Description
Example in Turtle:
(1) References vocabularies
(2) Initializes service and exposes
its resources and intents
(3) Refining hierarchy of resources
(4) Specifying extraction rules
(semantic lifting)
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Consuming Service Description
Accessing agent consumes service descriptions to structure authorization request:
o Retrieve service descriptor
o Derive exposed services
o Retrieve exposed resources of a service (optionally)
o Retrieve supported actions (optionally)
o For actions: derive affected resources, their elements and exposed operations
o Determine  requested actions/resources and applicable operations
and initialize a new scope
D  <remote service>
S  sdD sd.instanceOf(DASP-Service:Service)
R  resD s                          reshasResource
A  actD res                          acthasAction
act res, res                 el, act                   opaffectsResource hasElement hasOperation
30 Application – Use Scenario
Structuring Authorization Request
Structured scopes for three cases (accessing agent):
o Partially cooperative client – provides focused, but non-optimally constrained request
o Gmail: (1) retrieving a list of recent messages and (2) the value of 
From: field from the header of these messages needed
o MailChimp: (3) possibility to add an entity to a particular subscriber list
31 Application – Use Scenario
Structuring Authorization Request
Structured scopes for three cases (redacted by the resource owner):
o Redaction can be done in interactive or asynchronous flow
32 Annex
Deployment Models
Data-security Gateway - provider-centric and user-centric deployment models
Implements security evaluation and enforcement using provided vocabularies
Related work: https://demo.a-sit.at/am/
33 Conclusion
Integration with Other Frameworks
Aim – protocol-agnostic approach that scales beyond a single environment
Integration into OAuth 2.0 – additional steps (0 and 2b)
Authorization descriptor provided as Base64 encoded string
34 Conclusion
Conclusion
Observed issues:
o Under-specification leading to low management capability
o Semantic vs syntactic interoperability
Goal:
o Advancing manageability of security controls
o End-to-end integration and reuse of security controls
o Application beyond a single protocol (OAuth)
Approach:
o Introducing lightweight interoperability layer to connect 
different environments
o Decoupling security controls from service providers and 
associating them with service models
o Providing self-dereferenceable and transparent structures 
for resource- and context-aware management of authorizations
Any questions?
Thanks for your attention!
